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1. Introduction
We begin this paper with an analogy to the issues to 
be addressed. Consider the catastrophic hurricane of 
2005—Katrina. The city of New Orleans did have protec-
tion against the ravages of flooding associated with hurri-
canes. Like all insurance plans, it was based upon a sense 
of the distribution of the severity of hurricanes and the 
cost curve relating levee cost to levels of protection. The 
system in place was inadequate to protect New Orleans 
so a series of studies were conducted to address two cen-
tral questions. First, should the probability distribution of 
flood severity be redefined and new levees built based on 
the new information, holding constant the degree of pro-
tection thought to be provided by the previous system? 
For example, perhaps the severity of a 100 year flood 
was previously underestimated and current data provide 
what is believed to be a better estimate. If so and if pro-
tection from a 100 year flood is still the desire of the peo-
ple of Louisiana, then new levees to protect against such 
an event should be built stronger and higher. Second, if 
the previous definitions of these stressful events were on 
target, should the degree of protection provided by the 
levees be increased to withstand something more severe 
than a 100-year flood?1 In addressing these questions, one 
study suggests that the previous definitions were accu-
rate, but that a new and higher degree of protection ought 
to be provided. “A 100-year level of levee protection from 
hurricane storm surge is inadequate for a major city like 
New Orleans, and officials should consider relocating res-
idents out of the most vulnerable areas” (National Re-
search Council, 2009).  
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Abstract
The focus of this paper is on the house price stress test (termed ALMO) that was designed to assess the fiscal strength 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, if necessary, to trigger remedial action in order to avert a crisis. We assess 
whether the ALMO stress test was an adequate representation of an extremely weak housing market, given the best 
available information leading up to the Great Recession. A Monte Carlo simulation model is developed to estimate 
the severity of low probability events (i.e., severe house price declines). We illustrate the complexity and subjective 
nature of the process used to generate a plausible house price stress test scenarios. A major finding is that the ALMO 
stress test scenario severely understated (possibly by 50% or more) what an updated statistical process would have 
suggested. Part of this stems from idiosyncrasies related to the construction and implementation of ALMO, while 
other factors include a fundamental shift in the relationship between housing price appreciation and key explanatory 
variables—especially over the past 10–15 years, which shows a heightened role of momentum in explaining changes 
in housing prices. We offer several suggestions for a new stress test that include: continual updates and testing; vari-
ation across markets; and, like the recent FRB stress test, the scenario should be based on real (rather than nominal) 
price patterns. 
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1. A third possibility is that both the desired level of protection and the severity of a 100 year flood did not change, but the levees were flawed and 
did not provide the level of protection advertised.  
102 F o l l a i n  & G i e r t z  i n  J o u r n a l  o f  H o u s i n g  E c o n o m i c s  20  (2011) 
1.1. Economic capital as a buffer 
This paper undertakes a similar exercise, focusing not 
on hurricanes and levees, but rather on the ongoing de-
pression in many housing markets and economic capi-
tal, which US Banks and other financial institutions such 
as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were required to hold 
to protect against such severe economic events. As with 
New Orleans and Katrina, the protection in place for 
much of the US financial sector failed, so the same type 
of questions can be asked. First, did the policies and risk 
management systems in place prior to the Great Recession 
understate the likelihood and extent of a serious decline 
in house prices?2 This is akin to Katrina being caused by 
an underestimation of the frequency of a 100 year flood. 
Second, and aside from the first question, should the de-
sired level of protection built into risk management sys-
tems and sought by government regulators be amended 
to withstand events of greater severity? This is akin to 
saying that policymakers had a good grasp of the fre-
quency of a 100 year flood, but the latest flood was, say, a 
200 year event. In the first case, risk management systems 
should be recalibrated, based upon a more accurate and 
up-to-date view of a severe house price shock. In the sec-
ond case, analysts and regulators should reexamine evi-
dence to determine whether the benefits from increasing 
the level of protection exceed the costs. 
1.2. Motivation
The motivation for this paper is the collapse of US 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, in 
particular, the house price stress test scenario applied 
to these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). 
The test was designed to assess the economic strength 
of these institutions and, if necessary, to trigger reme-
dial action in order to avert a crisis. The stress scenario 
is based upon congressional legislation that outlines the 
degree of protection congress expected the GSEs to have 
in place—a scenario sometimes referred to as the ALMO 
stress test.3 Credit losses for the GSEs’ portfolios are pro-
jected using this scenario and a host of other assumptions, 
including the probabilities of default on particular pools 
of mortgages and the severity of losses in a stressful en-
vironment. These two home-mortgage securitizers were 
required to hold enough capital to withstand the ALMO 
stress test.4 The implementation of the stress test and the 
monitoring of the institutions’ adherence to its implica-
tions falls under the purview of the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA).5   
Figure 1. Cumulative HP Decline under ALMO and FRB stress tests. Source: Authors’ calculations. ALMO nominal is the nominal house price de-
cline used by FHFA (formerly OFHEO). ALMO (Real 1984–1987) expresses the ALMO scenario in real terms based on the actual rate of inflation 
during the ALMO experience. ALMO (Real 1997–2000) expresses the ALMO scenario in real terms during a period with lower inflation.  
2. In addition to understating the likelihood of a sharp drop in housing prices, the economic implications of such a drop may too have been under-
estimated. For example, the interconnectedness of the mortgage industry throughout the financial sector may not have been fully appreciated. 
3. ALMO stands for states Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma. The ALMO stress test is based on the experiences of these states dur-
ing the 1980s. 
4. A stress test scenario for housing refers to a clearly-defined and sustained path of substantial declines in house prices. This low probability sce-
nario is then used to predict the implications of such an event for financial institutions and for the broader economy. 
5. FHFA was created by legislation signed in 2008 that merged the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) and the Office of Federal Housing En-
terprise Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO officially went out of existence July 30, 2009—one year after the legislation was signed. Because most of 
the period of our study pre-dates the creation of FHFB, we generally refer to OFHEO as the regulatory body governing the GSEs and attribute 
data and models now housed by FHFA to OFHEO. 
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Before proceeding, consider four important characteris-
tics of OFHEO’s ALMO house price stress scenario: 
1. Most importantly, the house price pattern was con-
structed to simulate a weak housing market. The 
ALMO stress scenario is a ten year path of house prices 
in which prices are relatively flat for the first two years 
and then decline by about 13% over the next three 
years. Beyond year five, house prices rise such that the 
net change after 10 years is about zero (see Figure 1). 
2. The ALMO stress test is measured in nominal terms; 
there is no adjustment for variation in inflation across 
time-periods. Because ALMO was measured in nomi-
nal terms, it implies a more (less) severe stress scenario 
for periods where inflation is higher (lower) than dur-
ing the 1984–1993 ALMO period. During the run-up in 
US housing prices from 1997 to 2006, low inflation re-
sulted in an ALMO stress scenario that was 20% weaker 
in real terms than the actual ALMO experience (from 
1984 to 1993).6 The dotted line in Figure 1 shows the ac-
tual ALMO scenario converted to real terms and begin-
ning in 1997. By contrast, the dashed line shows what 
the ALMO path would have been, had it been defined 
in real terms (and thus adjusted for the inflation rate be-
ginning in 1984). The difference between the two lines 
is driven by the difference in the inflation rate between 
the two periods. Because ALMO was specified in nom-
inal terms, it substantially lessens the severity of the 
stress test for this low-inflation period. However, had 
ALMO been defined in real terms from the beginning, 
it would (at least for the first eight quarters) still repre-
sent a much less severe scenario than the 2009 FRB base 
scenario (FRB, 2009). Differences in inflation across the 
two periods accounts for about 40% of the difference 
between the ALMO and FRB base scenarios.7 
3. The scenario was not updated or amended as new infor-
mation became available and economic circumstances 
changed; that is, the same specific scenario was applied 
each year until the GSEs went into conservatorship in 
September 2008. 
4. The scenario is applied to all mortgages without consid-
eration for the geographic location of the property un-
derlying the mortgage. For example, the same scenario 
was applied to loans secured by houses in Los Ange-
les and those in rural North Dakota. Likewise, the sce-
nario did not change as lending standards became more 
lax, higher-risk borrowers entered the market en masse, 
and the complexity and breadth of mortgage securitiza-
tion increased. 
1.3. Goals and approach 
The primary goal of this paper is to examine whether the 
ALMO stress test was an adequate representation of an ex-
tremely weak housing market using the best available in-
formation up until the Great Recession. We pursue this goal 
by estimating a variety of regression specifications for real 
house price growth and then develop a Monte Carlo simula-
tion model to estimate low probability events. Extreme sce-
narios are defined as those paths over a threeyear period 
that represents the worst 1% and 5% outcomes. The speci-
fications are estimated using quarterly data on house prices 
from OFHEO for all fifty states and for years 1975–2009. We 
pay particular attention to variations in the definitions of 
stressful scenarios based upon the time-periods and groups 
of states included in the estimation. We also conduct a va-
riety of sensitivity analyses to learn more about the nature 
and robustness of a more up-to-date stress test scenario. 
A second goal of this paper is to illustrate the complex-
ity and subjective nature of the process used to generate a 
plausible house price stress test scenario.8 To that end, this 
paper highlights the numerous assumptions, sensitivity 
analyses, and other judgments necessary to define an ex-
treme house price event. This issue is raised because of the 
emphasis on transparency in many ongoing discussions 
about regulatory reform. For example, the importance of 
transparency was raised by the congressional oversight 
panel in its review and critique of the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) stress test, which we discuss in the next sec-
tion. While the report praised the FRB efforts, it also said 
that “additional transparency would be helpful both to as-
sess the strength of the banks and to restore confidence in 
the banking system.” While we agree that more informa-
tion about the details of the stress test would be helpful, 
6. From 1997 to 2006, the CPI increased by roughly 25%, compared to 40% for years 1984–1993. 
7. We are not positing that real price changes are the main driver of mortgage default. Indeed, nominal price appreciation is the critical driver; 
however, we do advocate basing the specific nominal stress test (applied in any given environment) on a severe real housing price scenario. 
The real scenario should be adjusted to account for expected inflation in the new environment, thus keeping the real value of the stress test con-
stant across inflationary environments. This was not the case with the ALMO stress test. It held the nominal stress test constant while allowing 
the real value to vary among inflationary environments. While the real impact of ALMO’s severity is understated for periods with low inflation 
rates, nominal price changes are important to monitor. Nominal housing price changes are likely more important than real price changes in de-
termining default. Absent nominal price changes, inflation lowers house prices by the rate of inflation, however, inflation also lowers outstand-
ing mortgage debt by the exact same percentage (in real terms). In the presence of deflation (along with nominal drops in house prices), it is pos-
sible for mortgages to become “under water” even with real house price appreciation, since, again in real terms, mortgage debt is increasing 
more rapidly than house prices. Of course, in modeling default, it also important to examine the relationship between inflation and mortgage in-
terest rates, since many times refinancing may be a better alternative than default. 
8. Because of the recent crisis, even the notion of a stress test has fundamentally changed. Until recently, the most serious risk faced by financial in-
stitutions invested in the mortgage market was believed to result from rising interest rates—which could in turn result in falling house values. 
The notion of plummeting house prices along with stable (or low) interest rates was often not on the radar screen. For example, see Stiglitz et al. 
(2002), who, in examining the risks that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed to the public, conclude that the probability of default by the GSEs 
is extremely small. In fact, they report that the GSEs could withstand a stress scenario that they estimate that has a less than one if 500,000 like-
lihood of occurring. Stiglitz et al. (2002) also note that the office of management and budget (OMB) had looked at the GSEs’ ability to withstand 
a ten-year great depression-like scenario. In describing OMB’s analysis, they report that, assuming 1990s levels of capital, “the probability of ei-
ther Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac defaulting would be ’close to zero.”  
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our conclusion is that transparency will not be sufficient to 
bring about widespread agreement about the appropriate 
stress test because, at its core, predicting extreme events is 
very difficult and evidence to define these events will not 
be equally compelling to all. 
1.4. Findings 
This paper finds that OFHEO’s ALMO stress test sce-
nario, in place at the beginning of the Great Recession se-
verely understated what a more robust and updated 
statistical process would have suggested. As shown in sub-
sequent sections, such a process would have implied a sce-
nario with more than double the price declines of ALMO. 
Part of this stems from a fundamental shift in the rela-
tionship between housing price appreciation and key ex-
planatory variables—especially over the past 10–15 years, 
which shows a heightened role of momentum in explain-
ing changes in housing prices. A variation of this paper’s 
preferred scenario incorporates the potential for a substan-
tial drop in employment growth, which in many cases re-
sults in an additional 20–30 percentage point drop in hous-
ing prices (over a three year period). 
Several broad policy implications stem from our analy-
sis. First and foremost, a regulatory stress test should be sub-
ject to ongoing scrutiny. A legislatively mandated stress test 
scenario without a process to provide scrutiny and updat-
ing seems inadequate to capture the dynamics of the hous-
ing and mortgage markets. Second, regulators cannot be ex-
pected to produce evidence of an extreme event that is both 
compelling to everyone and transparent. At some point, 
their independent and informed judgments must play a crit-
ical role. Third, a stress scenario should be constructed in 
real terms; otherwise, the effective severity of the stress test 
is driven by inflation (or expected inflation). Fourth, housing 
markets are influenced by both local and national (and in-
ternational) factors. Heterogeneity across local housing mar-
kets should be acknowledged and taken into account when 
constructing and implementing stress tests. 
1.5. Caveats 
It is important to keep in mind several important ca-
veats when drawing conclusions and policy implications 
from this work. First and most importantly, this paper es-
chews a full-scale autopsy of the reasons for the recent 
collapse in house prices and the unprecedented spike in 
mortgage foreclosures. The causes are numerous, the de-
bate and evaluation ongoing and it is still too early to esti-
mate anything remotely close to a fully specified structural 
model that captures the myriad of factors and players un-
derlying the crisis. Additionally, with so many factors at 
play, at the margin, any one of them could have pushed the 
financial sector over the edge. Nonetheless, and as demon-
strated in this paper, the estimated reduced form econo-
metric models do highlight patterns and changes occur-
ring in recent years, providing insights into improving the 
specification of a stress test, our primary goal. In particular, 
some of the patterns confirm and even enhance long-stand-
ing views among many analysts about the heterogeneity of 
housing markets and, especially the widely disparate im-
pacts of interest rate shocks and sharp distinctions in the 
house price process among high price variance versus 
other states. Another striking pattern is a sharp increase in 
the relative importance of lagged house price growth ver-
sus lagged employment growth, which seems consistent 
with the views of Robert Shiller and others who empha-
size the role of overblown and unsustainable expectations 
about house price appreciation in the early 2000s. More 
generally, plausible versions of a basic reduced form equa-
tion seem to have changed in important ways, which leads 
us to make the case for new and more severe stress tests for 
the mortgage and home finance markets. 
Second, the focus here is upon the stress test scenario fed 
into the larger model used by OFHEO to compute regula-
tory risk-based capital for the GSEs. No attention is given to 
the many other features of the process, which will undoubt-
edly be found to have their own systematic shortcomings 
upon careful scrutiny and updating. In particular, the size 
and implications of a severe stress scenario may be very dif-
ferent in a different institutional environment. Obviously, 
getting the institutions right is a tremendously important 
and difficult task—and again, one that is not addressed here. 
Third, a technical note, our focus is on a stress scenario 
for a representative state (or a composite state). Another al-
ternative is to pick one based upon a representative sample 
of states. This becomes important if geographic diversifica-
tion is thought to be critical. Indeed, earlier work on Basel II 
(see Calem and Follain (2003)) found that a nationally diver-
sified portfolio would be expected to have 40% of the capi-
tal associated with a regionally concentrated portfolio. That 
conclusion may also need to be reexamined in light of more 
recent history. Rather than pursue the issue in this paper, 
which is a major and complex effort in itself, we choose to 
state it as a caveat that warrants additional research. How-
ever, such considerations would only alter the specific sizes 
of the stress test scenario, but not the relative rankings or 
the broader qualitative issues that we raise and identify. 
Fourth, we are silent about the role of the GSEs them-
selves. We have in mind their ongoing responsibility to 
monitor what they (and their shareholders, which for 
the time being is primarily the federal government it-
self) consider to be prudent amounts of economic cap-
ital above and beyond what is required by regulators.9 
In fact, one of us (Follain) was part of a group at Fred-
die Mac from 2000 to 2002 with the mission of looking 
into this issue. A particularly interesting and intriguing 
question is what the internal monitors of credit risk capi-
tal for mortgages were finding and saying to senior man-
agement and the Board of Directors in the months and 
years leading up to the collapse. It appears that they also 
underestimated events such as Great Recession. It would 
seem appropriate to release more information on their 
thinking.  
9. However, given that these institutions are already insolvent (save for government rescue), it is unlikely that they have the means to increase 
their economic capital, absent additional assistance. 
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2. Recent literature and background 
This paper is part of a large and burgeoning literature 
addressing the current mortgage crisis, its causes, and po-
tential remedies. Two aspects of this vast literature are of 
intense focus here. The first is the research on bank capi-
tal and the GSEs. This portion of the literature places the 
development and use of stress tests in the context of the 
broader issue of setting regulatory capital guidelines for 
large financial institutions. The second (area of focus) is 
the large body of work on the drivers of house prices. This 
has been a research focus, especially in the field of real es-
tate and urban economics, for many years. A recent surge 
is underway in this literature to explore the reasons for the 
collapse in house prices and the accuracy of the previous 
structural models of house prices to explain the collapse. 
The goal of this survey section is not to provide a compre-
hensive overview of this literature, but rather to motivate 
and contextualize our decision to focus upon a relatively 
simple model of house price growth. 
2.1. The role of a stress test scenario for economic capital 
The function of regulatory capital is to provide financial 
institutions with sufficient (liquid) assets to withstand a se-
rious deterioration or elimination of its net worth. The cap-
ital is usually expressed as a percent of the institution’s as-
sets. This is how leverage requirement rules are defined. 
Risk-based capital rules, like those proposed for Basel II, al-
low the final percentage to vary with the riskiness of the 
bank’s portfolio.10 Various methods have been proposed 
to help institutions and regulators determine and maintain 
optimal economic capital to assets ratio. Some, like Basel II, 
are rulesbased, but are also risk-adjusted. Calem and Fol-
lain (2003) present an example that illustrates how the pro-
posed Basel II rules would be applied for mortgages. The 
paper’s focus rests upon one formula embedded in the Ba-
sel II framework. A parameter in that formula (central to 
the process) is the correlation between mortgage default 
and a single state variable intended to capture the major 
economic forces that drive this process. Calem and Follain 
(2003) examine a variety of benchmarks in estimating the 
assetcorrelation parameter for mortgages that offer the pro-
tection proposed in Basel II—which would require portfo-
lios to be no riskier than BBB+ bonds (which are sometimes 
termed “medium safe”). Given the rule and Basel II’s as-
sumed asset-correlation parameter of 15%, banks would 
compute their required regulatory capital by inserting into 
formulas other information about their mortgage portfo-
lio—e.g., estimates of the current probability of default 
(pd) and loss given default (LGD). 
In contrast to Basel II, Congress created OFHEO (in 
1992) and charged them to carry out a different approach 
for estimating risk-based capital requirements for mort-
gages backed by the two GSEs. This approach is built 
around a large and complex model used to measure the 
credit losses of the portfolios held by the GSEs. Specific 
characteristics of the mortgages are entered into a set of 
equations that outputs estimated default probabilities for 
various categories of mortgages. The model also estimates 
losses given default in a stress scenario, the potential value 
of existing credit enhancements, and many other factors. 
A critical part of this system is the OFHEO (also referred 
to as ALMO) stress test, which is a projected path of na-
tional house prices during a ten year stress period. The 
GSEs were required to hold enough capital to withstand 
this stress test scenario. The specifics of this stress scenario 
were presented in the introduction. 
The FRB employs another alternative in conducting its 
2009 stress test. Like the OFHEO stress test, the FRB stress 
test specified the severity of house price declines. Unlike 
the OFHEO stress test, the process the FRB followed not 
set by legislation. While many of the details have not been 
made public, the FRB test appears to have been based upon 
expert opinions, recent historical trends and internal judg-
ments. The FRB stress test was then applied using inter-
nal and proprietary models of the financial institutions af-
fected—which were also not made public. While many of 
the details remain secret, it seems clear that the FRB felt 
that the OFHEO stress scenario was not severe enough 
(again see the Figure 1). 
A recent paper by Löffler (2009) is very much in the 
spirit of our work. In addressing a similar question, Löf-
fler employs an AR(1) model, using national house price 
data, to test whether the actual decline in house prices is 
consistent with his simulation results. He answers affirma-
tively; that is, his AR(1) model applied to the OFHEO data 
series for the entire US from 1975 to 2005 could produce ex-
treme outcomes that include what has actually happened. 
However, applying the same approach to Case-Shiller data 
for 20 large cities yields a different conclusion. We will of-
fer similar insights—the answer depends upon which data 
and which model one uses to generate distributions for fu-
ture changes to house prices. 
2.2. Reduced form versus structural model of house prices 
The literature exploring house price movements is im-
mense and growing rapidly.11 It includes traditional mul-
tiple equation structural models with a wide variety of 
exogenous variables, as well as time-series and VAR ap-
proaches. (See Malpezzi (1999) for a good example of the 
latter approach.) These models are estimated with national, 
state and metropolitan-level data. Through the course of 
this research project, we have explored a wide array of 
models; however, the analysis in the following sections is 
based upon the estimation of a single-equation time-series 
model with lagged values of several economic variables 
as well grouped-state dummies and year fixed effects. 
Though we recognize that such a model is unable (and 
does not even attempt) to sort out the numerous and evolv-
ing factors that have contributed to the massive declines in 
house prices, we do feel it is an appropriate approach for 
our purposes for several reasons.   
10. For the a recent statement from the FRB regarding the status of Basel II, see http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-17555.pdf 
11. For example, note the recent spate of articles published in the Journal of Housing Economics: http://www.citeulike.org/journal/els-10511377 
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One particular variable, the user cost of capital, is omit-
ted, even though it is quite common in house price model; 
thus, an explanation for omitting it is in order. The user cost 
of capital can be expressed such that uc = (i – π)P, where i 
is an interest rate, π is the expected rate of future price ap-
preciation of housing, and P is the price of housing stock. 
The role of user cost is firmly ingrained in standard theories 
of investment and housing economists have written scores 
of articles investigating its role in a wide variety of situa-
tions.12 We omit user cost because it rests upon an impor-
tant assumption that, in our view, cannot be adequately de-
fended given the experiences of the 2000s. That assumption 
is that we can estimate with confidence the expected rate of 
housing price appreciation. However, it appears that expec-
tations about future of house prices have diverted in fun-
damental ways from views previously held by mainstream 
housing economists. The simplest explanation is that ex-
pectations were “irrational”—an idea long championed by 
Robert Shiller and a result found throughout the experi-
mental literature on asset bubbles (Caginalp et al., 2000). 
This view holds that expectations can be heavily influenced 
by recent price changes and that the five to ten years lead-
ing up to the 2006 peak were dominated by positive mo-
mentum. Thus, prices became much less rooted to long-
term benchmarks. So this critical input to user cost seems 
very difficult to measure with any confidence. Follain (2008) 
elaborates on this point, with specific references to the ideas 
of Shiller and his longtime collaborator, Karl Case. 
This view is not universally held. In fact, several re-
cent papers have estimated house price models with a user 
cost component. These include Goodman and Thibodeau 
(2008), Case and Quigley (2009) and Gabriel et al. (2008). 
These papers necessarily rely upon a rule or benchmark to 
specify user cost and by using these previous benchmarks 
can identify a widely held view—house prices were des-
tined to decline and the bubble to burst. We surely agree 
with this prediction, but it is based upon some measur-
able and exogenous benchmark of expected house price in-
flation. Our approach circumvents this step, allowing us 
to remain agnostic with respect to expected housing price 
appreciation. Instead, we include two key interest rate 
measures and lagged values of house price growth. As is 
demonstrated in the next two sections, this specification 
shows substantial increases in the relative importance of 
lagged inflation as a predictor of changes to house prices 
in the latter years. This is consistent with the basic views 
of Case and Shiller and runs counter to an approach that 
rests upon steady measures of expected inflation. Some-
thing dramatic happened to these expectations in the last 
10 years that seems outside of any previous benchmarks. 
Until more is learned about how to model these expecta-
tions, a less specific and less structural approach may have 
substantial advantages. 
The model we estimate includes lagged values of the de-
pendent variable as well as lags of all of the other state-spe-
cific covariates, such as employment. Some papers focus 
attention on a more precise and statistically driven speci-
fication and interpretation of the lagged terms on the en-
dogenous variables. One example is Capozza et al. (2004). 
They develop a dynamic difference equation with autore-
gressive error terms. This approach includes a parameters 
that encompass a wide range of possible outcomes from 
mean reversion to the other extreme of divergent oscilla-
tion. They also include economic variables intended to 
proxy for information costs, supply costs, and expectations. 
Their empirical analysis uses data for 62 large metro areas 
for the years 1979–1995. Based on estimates from various 
lag structures, they calculate specific measures of mean re-
version versus momentum. They find wide variations in 
the estimated coefficients and the implied dynamic behav-
ior among the metropolitan areas and conclude that the dy-
namic properties of housing markets are specific to time 
and location. 
In another paper, Lai and Order (2010) also develop and 
estimate a dynamic difference equation with the poten-
tial to measure mean reversion and momentum. They use 
data for 44 MSAs from 1980 to 2005 and rely on an equi-
librium relationship between rents and values. They report 
evidence of momentum throughout the period; however, 
momentum increased substantially after 1999 resulting in 
what could be characterized as a bubble after 2003. 
Our results also shed light on these issues, but our ap-
proach is simpler and, again, imposes less structure on the 
coefficients. As mentioned above, our approach also in-
cludes several lags of the key variables. We chose four 
quarterly lags as a plausable starting specification but did 
not pursue or test for the possibility of a unique or optimal 
lag structure for all groups and time periods examined. In-
stead, we highlight the sum of the lagged coefficients of 
the lagged house price terms as an indicator of the poten-
tial of the momentum effect. All else equal, a positive sum 
of these coefficients is interpreted as momentum; the larger 
the sum the stronger the momentum. A negative sum is in-
terpreted as mean reversion. 
3. Data and estimation 
3.1. Data 
Several sources are used to create quarterly time-se-
ries datasets for each of the 50 US states and D.C. The data 
extend from the beginning of 1975 to the third quarter of 
2009. Housing price data are from OFHEO’s state housing 
price index (HPI).13 HPI is a repeat-sales index that mea-
sures state-level price growth for single family housing and 
includes housing purchased using conventional mortgages 
that is subsequently purchased or securitized by Fan-
nie Mae or Freddie Mac. Interest rate data rates for Trea-
sury notes and bills are from US Treasury (and are avail-
able from numerous sources). Quarterly data on nonfarm 
employment are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
12. One of us (Follain) has written many articles that highlight the potential role of user cost as it relates to housing, including one that was written 
over 25 years ago (Follain, 1982). 
13. As noted earlier, in 2009 OFHEO was absorbed into the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  
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Data on each state (along with the interest rate variables) 
are pooled into one large dataset comprising 7089 observa-
tions (139 observations for each of the 50 states and D.C.).   
States are separated into three groups in order to com-
pare the experiences of states with different characteris-
tics. The state groupings are constructed by ranking states 
by the variance of their HPI from 1991 to 2009. States with 
more housing price variability are likely to respond dif-
ferently to exogenous changes than are states with lower 
variances. For example, housing supply may be more in-
elastic in these states. (See Goodman and Thibodeau, 2008, 
and Harter-Dreiman, 2004, for recent empirical findings on 
housing supply elasticities.) The state groupings are: 
1. Delaware, Massachusetts, California, Rhode Island, New 
York, New Jersey, Maryland, New Hampshire, Hawaii, 
Florida, Maine, Virginia, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, 
D.C. and Nevada. These are the high-variance states. 
Also, note that these states are primarily “coastal” and 
are often characterized by large MSAs where land (or 
housing) is relatively constrained. 
2. Connecticut, Vermont, Minnesota, Colorado, Montana, 
Utah, Pennsylvania, Idaho, Wyoming, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Wisconsin, New Mexico, Georgia, Alaska, South 
Carolina and Missouri. These are the medium-variance 
states. 
3. South Dakota, North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
North Dakota, Kentucky, Alabama, Kansas, Iowa, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, Arkansas, West Virginia, Ohio, 
Texas, Oklahoma and Indiana. These are the low-vari-
ance states. In general, the population centers of these 
states are not characterized by binding land (or hous-
ing) constraints. Traffic congestion is also less severe 
in the population centers of these states, and thus, the 
non-pecuniary costs of living farther from the central 
business district, for example, are relatively low. 
Table 1 compares summary statistics for each of these 






















and 1991–2009. Real HPI growth (weighted by state em-
ployment) varies greatly over time and across state groups. 
By definition, HPI variability falls as one moves from 
group 1 to group 3. However, it is also true that states with 
higher price variances also experienced the greatest in-
creases in real housing prices from 1975 to 2009. When in-
cluding all years, real annual HPI appreciation for group 1 
is four times that for group 2—the HPI for group 3 states 
is the same (in real terms) after quarter 3 of 2009 as it was 
when the dataset began in quarter 1 of 1975. Breaking these 
numbers down by time-period shows even greater dis-
parity across groups from 1975 to 1990. Post-1991, the pic-
ture is quite different. Here, HPI growth is stable across all 
three groups of states (ranging from a low HPI increase of 
1.2% to a high of 1.6%). 
Comparing the two time-periods, overall real HPI 
growth is over twice as large post-1991 than pre-1990 
(1.5% versus 0.7%)—even after accounting for the substan-
tial drop in housing prices beginning in 2006. For group 
1 states, average annual HPI growth drops from 2.7% pre 
1991 to 1.6% post 1990. For the other two groups, the re-
verse is true: negative growth pre 1990 is followed by aver-
age annual growth that ranges from 1.2 to 1.5% post 1991. 
Figure 2 plots the real HPI for each of the three groups 
of states. By construction, all groups start at a value of 100 
in 1975. The trend for each group is based on the weighted 
average HPI for states within the group—where the aver-
ages are weighted by state employment. The direction of 
changes is similar for groups 1 and 2, but the pattern is 
greatly amplified for group 1—with both much more pre-
cipitous increases and decreases. The pattern for group 3 is 
a muted version of that for group 2, except during the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, where the two trends diverge. In con-
trast to HPI growth, employment growth is much more ro-
bust pre-1990 than post-1991. This is due primarily to the 
dismal rate of US employment growth during the first de-
cade of the 2000s (see Irwin, 2010). The pattern is similar 
for each of the groups; however, the drop in employment 
growth is more pronounced for group 1 states, where the 
annual growth rate fell by 1.8 percentage points (versus 1 
percentage point for group 2 and 3 states). 
3.2. Estimation approach 
Equation 1 relates housing price appreciation to funda-
mentals that are believed to influence housing prices. It in-
cludes time and fixed effects for state groups in order to ab-
sorb unobserved factors and can be expressed such that: 
                                                                                              
4    log (  HPit   ) =  t + group + season + ∑ (  HPit–j  )             HPit–1                                          j=1  HPit–1–j 
                                                  4
                               + ∑ (  Empit–j  ) + δ1(TB10t–4 – TB1t–4 )                                                j=1   Empit–1–j
                               + δ2TB10t  + εit           (1) 
The dependent variable, log(HPit/HPit–1), measures the 
quarterly growth rate in real housing prices (HP) for state i 
in time t. The explanatory variables include lags of housing 
Table 1.  Annual growth rates. 
                                All               Group 1           Group 2          Group 3 
1975–2009 
RealHPIa  1.2  2.4  0.7  0.0 
Employmenta  2.1  2.3  1.7  2.2 
TB10b  –0.14 
TB10 – TB1b  0.10 
1975–1990 
RealHPIa  0.7  2.7  –0.1 –1.2 
Employmenta  2.5  3.0  2.0  2.4 
TB10b  –0.01 
TB10 – TB1b  0.09 
1991–2009 
RealHPIa  1.5  1.6  1.5  1.2 
Employmenta  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.4 
TB10b  –0.25 
TB10 –TB1b  0.11 
Calculations are based on data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO), BLS, 
and U.S. Treasury. 
a. Measured in percent change. 
b. Measured in percentage point change.  






















price growth, log(HPit–j/HPit–1–j), and lags of employment 
growth, log(Empit–j/Empit–1–j), for the preceding four quar-
ters, where j represents lagged quarters one to four. Hous-
ing price lags are included to help distinguish between 
markets characterized by price momentum and those 
where mean reversion is more prominent. Momentum (or 
self-reinforcing) effects would include bubbles, where be-
havior such as speculation can lead to periods of rapid 
price increases and, after peaking, rapid price decreases. 
Lags in employment growth are intended to pick up more 
traditional changes in housing demand. The ten-year trea-
sury rate (TB10) is included because it is correlated with 
mortgage interest rates and is also exogenous (i.e., not in-
fluenced by changing lending practices, etc.). Additionally, 
a one-year lag of the yield spread (TB10t–4 – TB1t–4) is also 
included because it has been shown to be a good predictor 
of real economic activity (e.g., see Estrella and Hardouve-
lis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). Additionally, dum-
mies for state-group (group), time (t) and seasonal (season) 
are included in the equation.  
As an alternative to group dummies, full state fixed ef-
fects could be included in the model. This would impose 
stronger controls for heterogeneity across states, but would 
reduce the degrees of freedom and wash away within-
group cross-sectional variation. Results in the follow-
ing sections are not sensitive to several alternative criteria 
for grouping states. For example, results from employing 
groupings used by Abraham and Hendershott (1994) OF-
HEO has only a nominal effect on the results. 
By imposing a variety of sample restrictions, we test 
whether the relationships described in Equation 1 have 
changed over time and whether they vary by region. To 
this end, Equation 1 is estimated for the following samples: 
1. All observations (from 1975 to quarter 3 of 2009). 
2. High price variance states. 
3. Medium and low price variance states. 
4. Observations from 1975 to quarter 4 of 1990. 
5. High price variance states for years 1975 to quarter 4 
of 1990. 
6. Medium and low price variance states for years 1975 
to quarter 4 of 1990. 
7. Observations from 1991 to quarter 3 of 2009. 
8. High price variance states for years 1991 to quarter 3 
of 2009. 
9. Medium and low price variance for years 1990 to 
quarter 3 of 2009. 
10. Observations from 1975 to quarter 4 of 2000. 
By comparing estimated coefficients when employing 
these different sample restrictions, we test whether the re-
lationship between the explanatory variables and hous-
ing price growth varies across states. For example, hous-
ing prices in states where housing supply is more inelastic 
should be more responsive to the explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, changes to political and economic institu-
tions could alter the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and housing price growth. And, it is possible that 
these changes had a heterogeneous impact across the coun-
try. Results from the regression analysis can be used to ex-
amine these questions. 
The fixed effects can be thought of as measuring the in-
fluence of an array of factors that are not explicitly included 
in the estimation—and which often are not available in suf-
ficient detail over a long period of time. Additionally, if, 
over time, there are major shifts in the relationship between 
explanatory variables and housing price growth, then our 
insight into the factors that led to the collapse of major 
components of the US financial sector may be limited. As 
addressed in a later section, a heavy reliance on fixed ef-
fects makes it difficult to assign a relative importance to the 
array of factors that may have contributed to the sharp de-
cline in the housing market and the broader turmoil that 
spread through the economy more generally, however, we 
show that our analysis can be used to assign probabilities 
to various severe economic events—even if the proximate 
cause of the economic stress remains opaque. 
4. Evaluation of model estimates and implications 
In this section estimates are presented for the model de-
veloped in the previous section. The factors correlated with 
housing price growth are examined for the full sample and 
then compared to estimates for the various subsamples in 
order to highlight possible heterogeneity in this relationship 
over time and across states. Additionally, the regression re-
sults are important because they lay the foundation for the 
simulation and stress test conducted later in this section. 
4.1. Review of regression estimates 
Table 2 presents regression estimates for Equation (1) 
under the ten different sample restrictions. Estimated coef-
ficients for the four employment growth lags vary greatly 
by specification, but consistent with theory, are always pos-
itive. As a caveat, while employment is a core fundamental 
in determining housing prices, the theoretical foundations 
Figure 2. Real housing price appreciation by state group. Calcula-
tions are based on FHFA’s (formerly OFHEO) state housing price in-
dex. The housing price index is normalized to 100 for all states in 1975. 
Group averages are weighted by state employment. See Section 3 for 
state groupings.  
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for the relationship between changes in employment and 
changes in house prices is less clear. To the extent that 
changes in employment (which influence housing de-
mand) are expected, they should already be factored into 
housing prices, preventing opportunities for arbitrage. 
Thus, changes in housing prices should only affect hous-
ing prices to the extent that these changes are unexpected. 
This is a parallel to the random walk hypothesis for stock 
prices. However, the extent to which housing markets are 
efficient in this respect is not a settled issue (see, e.g., Case 
and Shiller, 1989; Shiller, 2005). 
Turning to lagged housing price appreciation, estimated 
coefficients are negative (at least for lags from the two pre-
vious quarters) for all samples that include pre-1991 data 
(columns 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 of Table 2). This suggests 
mean reversion: price increases (decreases) in one quar-
ter are followed by price decreases (increases). This is also 
inconsistent with pricing bubbles. By contrast, the corre-
sponding lagged coefficients are generally positive for all 
of the post-1990 samples (columns 2, 7, and 9 of Table 2). 
And, among the specifications including only post-1990 
data, estimated coefficients on the housing price lags are 
much larger when group 1 (i.e., high variance) states are in-
cluded in the sample. Taken together, this suggests that a 
change occurred not just in the magnitude of the relation-
ship between housing price growth and the lags, but also 
in the direction of that relationship. The pattern in this later 
period is consistent with bubble phenomena (although 
other explanations also exist), where price changes in one 
quarter are self-reinforcing in subsequent quarters.14 
4.1.1. Insights from the full sample 
Table 3 presents a summary of the key results from the 
regressions. Estimated coefficients on the lagged variables 
are summed to assess the cumulative impact of lagged 
housing price and employment growth, respectively. Col-
umn 1 of Table 2 shows a strong relationship between 
lagged employment and housing prices; a 1% increase in 
employment over each of the previous 4 quarters is asso-
ciated with a 1.36% increase in real housing prices. The re-
lationship between lagged housing price growth and cur-
rent housing price growth is negative; a 1% increase in real 
housing prices over each of the previous 4 quarters is as-
sociated with a –0.26% change in current housing prices 
(again adjusted for inflation). This pattern is inconsistent 
with pricing bubbles, since price increases, ceteris paribus, 
are generally followed by decreases and vice-versa. 
4.1.2. Insights from comparing results from the subsamples 
Recall that the US experience over the past decade has 
been unique, not only in the magnitude of price apprecia-
tion (and subsequent price depreciation), but also in scope. 
Never before (or at least since the advent of modern house-
price indexes) has housing price appreciation been so
14. Another explanation for what we characterize as mean-reverting 
phenomena, is simply data noise. Under this scenario, which cannot 
be ruled out, an outlier (due to measurement error) in one period is 
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widespread, with similar phenomena observed across 
much of the country (with only a few exceptions). How-
ever, while the trends have been more homogeneous than 
in the past, the degree to which prices changed did vary 
greatly across the country. The high price variance states 
have seen sharper price increases followed by sharper de-
creases over the past two decades than have the primarily 
medium and low price variance states (again, see Figure 2). 
A comparison of the sum of lagged coefficients for the high 
price variance and medium and low price variance regres-
sions buttresses the patterns observed in the data.   
Regression results (presented in Table 3) are suggestive 
of a structural change in the relationship between housing 
price appreciation and the explanatory variables. The pre-
1991 regression (Table 3, column 4) yields cumulative ef-
fects from lagged employment and lagged housing prices 
that are similar to those from the full sample. However, the 
relationship between both sets of lags and house price ap-
preciation is amplified. The sum of both the employment 
and housing price lags are larger in absolute magnitude, 
suggesting greater reliance on employment growth (a core 
fundamental) and also that a change in housing prices will 
be followed by a more rapid (or larger) reversion in the op-
posite direction (which again is inconsistent with selfrein-
forcing price bubbles).15 This is in stark contrast to the post-
1990 regression (Table 3, column 7), where the sum of the 
employment lags is 0.42, or 71% smaller than for the pre-
1991 period. Turning to the housing price lags, the differ-
ence in the cumulative measure is even more startling. 
Post-1990, the cumulative housing price lags equal 0.62—
i.e., very close in absolute magnitude to the measure for the 
pre-1991 period (–0.57), but the direction of the relationship 
has reversed (from negative to positive)! This suggests a 
shift away from fundamentals and towards a market char-
acterized by momentum and pricing bubbles. Post-1990 
period, lagged housing price growth does not act to offset 
current growth as the momentum effect dominates, leading 
to ever larger price appreciation; likewise, price declines 
are self-reinforcing, leading to even sharper price declines. 
Weighting the regressions by employment (so that 
larger states are given more importance than smaller ones) 
paints a somewhat different picture. Again, see Table 3. 
When including all years, momentum now tends to dom-
inate. For group 2 and 3 states, mean reversion is still pres-
ent, but is very modest. For the group 1 states, momentum 
dominates. It may be that momentum is more pronounced 
in some of the larger states within group 1. For example, 
California, New York and Florida are in group 1 and all 
saw sharp runups in house prices. These three states con-
stitute less than 18% of the group 1 sample (i.e., three of 17 
states), but roughly 55% of group 1 employment. Thus, for 
the group 1 regressions, employment weighting increases 
the importance of these three states by more than threefold. 
In any case, with employment weighting, what we charac-
terize as momentum increases sharply for all groups when 
moving from the pre 1990 to post 1991 specifications (con-
sistent with the unweighted results). 
For each of the ten (unweighted) specifications, F-tests 
find that the cumulative impact of the employment growth 
lags are statistically different from 0 at nearly any level of 
significance. The one exception is the pre-1991 specification 
for the high variance states, where the lagged employment 
variables have a p-value of 0.051. Turning to the housing 
price lags, F-tests find that, for seven of the specifications, 
the cumulative effect of the lags are statistically different 
from 0 at nearly any level of significance. However, for the 
three of the five specifications that include pre-1991 data 
for high price variance states (specifications shown in col-
umns 1, 4, and 6 of Table 2), the cumulative effect of the 
housing price lags is not statistically different from 0—a re-
sult consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.16 
Next, a χ2 test is employed to assess the statistical im-
portance of the apparent structural break shown in Table 3. 
In comparing the pre-1991 and post-1990 regressions (col-
umns 4 and 7 from Table 2), the χ2 test results are consistent 
with a structural break for both employment and housing 
prices; i.e., the null that the sum of the coefficients on the 
lagged housing price variables are equal in the two regres-
sions is rejected at virtually any significance level; and, the 
same is true when testing for the equality of the sum of the 
coefficients on the lagged employment terms. This same 
result is found again when comparing pre-1991with post-
1990 regressions that include only the states with low and 
moderate house price variances (columns 6 and 9 of Table 
2). Looking only at the high price variance states (columns 
5 and 8 of Table 2), the χ2 test results are again consistent 
with a structural break for the housing price lags (at the 
1% level), but not for the employment lags (even though 
the sum of the lagged employment coefficients pre-1991 is 
about 1.5 times larger than the equivalent post-1990 mea-
sure). Finally, when comparing high price variance states 
to medium and low price variance states, the null that the 
sum of the coefficients are the same for the two groups can 
never be rejected for both employment and housing prices. 
4.1.3. Other factors to consider 
Estimated coefficients for the other two economic vari-
ables—TB10 and the yield spread lagged four quarters—also 
show variability across both state grouping and time. The 
estimated coefficient for TB10 is consistently negative and 
statistically significant, implying that lower long-term inter-
est rates are associated with higher housing prices. As noted 
earlier, changes to TB10 are a proxy for changes in mort-
gage rates, but are likely exogenous, since they are not in-
fluenced by changes to the characteristics of borrowers (such 
as their probabilities of default). Also, recall that TB10 is 
not in log form (and is not differenced), since this has im-
portant implications for interpreting the estimated coeffi-
cients. In contrast to employment growth, the estimated co-
efficients on TB10 are much larger (in absolute magnitude) 
post-1990 than pre-1991. The difference across time-periods 
is, at least partly, due to the much higher inflation pre-1991 
and to the fact that TB10 is a nominal interest rate (whereas 
housing price growth is measured in real terms). High real 
15. This result is consistent with arguments made by Shiller (2005). 
16. When including all of the data, the housing price lags are statistically significant at the 10% level. For the other two specifications (columns 4 
and 6 from Table 2), these lags have p-values in excess of 0.3.  
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interest rates discourage home-buying, whereas high nomi-
nal rates (along with expectations for high inflation) should 
not. Across states, the relationship is stronger for the lower 
price variation states than for the high variation states—pos-
sibly suggesting a stronger connection to fundamentals in 
the former group. χ2 tests also support the claim that the im-
portance of TB10 differs both across time periods and across 
states. When comparing regressions for high price variance 
states to those for medium and low price-variance states, the 
null that the coefficient for TB10 is the same across states is 
always rejected. And, for both sets of states, results from χ2 
tests confirm a structural break in the relationship between 
TB10 and growth in housing prices. All of this supports the 
notion that housing markets are local, that housing supply 
elasticities are heterogeneous across communities, and state 
and local characteristics are important factors to consider 
when analyzing housing markets.   
The yield spread has a statistically significant and posi-
tive impact for all of the post-1990 specifications.17 The ef-
fect is about 4.8 times larger from the high price variance 
states than for median and low price variance states (0.0037 
versus 0.0008, respectively). The effect of the slope of the 
yield curve is sometimes negative and always statistically 
insignificant for pre-1991 specifications and when includ-
ing all years. The null that the effect of yield spread is the 
same across specifications generally cannot be rejected (by 
a χ2 test).18 The lag of the yield spread has been shown to be 
a good predictor of recessions (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998) 
and of economic activity more generally (Estrella and Har-
douvelis, 1991), however, its relationship with house prices 
appears to be much weaker. This may be because the cor-
relation between housing prices and economic activity is 
not nearly as strong as the relationship between some other 
variables, such as residential investment, and economic 
growth (Leamer, 2007). And, the past couple of years aside, 
negative demand shocks generally manifest themselves in 
changes to investment, rather than falling prices. 
Another important difference seen when comparing 
the regression estimates is the year fixed effects, which al-
low for year-specific constant terms. Adding the constant 
term to the average of the year fixed effects yields an aver-
age constant term for the post-1990 specification of 0.05, or 
well over twice as large as the pre-1991 measure (0.02). At 
first glance, it appears that fixed effects explain much more 
of the growth in the later period. However, it more likely re-
flects the fact that average real housing price growth for the 
US was much higher from 1991 to 2009 than for years 1975–
1990, the past few years notwithstanding. In fact, as mea-
sured by OFHEO housing price index, average annual real 
housing price growth was 3.8 times greater in the latter pe-
riod (1.72% versus 0.45%). Comparing the same measure 
(i.e., the constant term plus the average of the year fixed ef-
fects) across states (instead of across time periods) yields an 
estimate for the states with low to medium house price vari-
ance that is roughly three times the corresponding measured 
for the high variance states (0.06 versus 0.02, respectively). 
Again, the states with high variances in housing prices also 
had much greater real house price appreciation over years 
1975–2009, even after factoring in the recent decline, which 
likely goes a long way in explaining the larger fixed effects 
for the regressions that include only these states. 
In addition to these differences, the estimated root mean 
square error (RMSE) also differs greatly across time-peri-
ods, with the pre-1991 specifications yielding RMSEs three 
to four times as large as those for the post-1990 specifica-
tions. For the pre-1991 specifications, the RMSE always ex-
ceeds 0.04; for the three post-1990 specifications, the RMSE 
is 0.01 (or slightly larger). When including all years, the 
RMSE is about 0.03. (Interestingly, for a given time-period, 
the RMSE varies little across state groupings.) These dif-
ferences have important implications for the forthcoming 
Monte Carlo exercise and the resulting stress test scenarios. 
In sum and in broad terms, the estimation suggests dra-
matic differences in the underlying statistically based char-
acterizations of the pre- and post-1990 periods. The more re-
cent regime and the high price variance states show house 
price growth being much less sensitive to what are typically 
thought to be the “real” drivers of house price growth—em-
ployment growth and interest rates—less mean reversion, 
much more sensitivity to recent momentum in house price 
growth, and a lower constant growth rate. This relation-
ship is more pronounced in the post-1990 era and especially 
among the high price variance states in that period. 
4.2. The distribution of changes in house prices 
Here, the estimated coefficients lay the foundation for a 
Monte Carlo simulation model. The simulation serves two 
broad purposes. First, it provides insights into the compar-
ative statics implied by all aspects of the model estimates, 
including the implications regarding the mean square error 
and the role of momentum. Second, it generates estimates 
of specific stress test scenarios associated with extreme out-
comes, which is a key goal of this paper. 
4.2.1. Monte Carlo method 
Estimated coefficients from the various regressions are 
used to project house price growth rates over three years 
(12 quarters). In addition to the estimated coefficients, in-
puts into the simulation include lagged values of employ-
ment growth, house price growth and interest rates in the 
year prior to the projection, as well as employment growth 
and interest rate scenarios during the three years of the 
projection. Prior to the Monte Carlo simulation, the regres-
sion estimates are used to generate predicted housing price 
paths over 12 quarters, where the predicted values are im-
puted by combining out-sample-data with the estimated 
regression coefficients.19 In place of generating separate 
17. Given the rate for TB10, an increase in the spread implies a reduction in the short-term interest rate. 
18. The one exception, where the null is rejected, is when comparing the pre-1991 and post-1990 specification that includes all states (columns 4 
and 7 of Table 2). 
19. The constant term for these imputations is equal to the estimated constant term plus the (weighted) average of the estimated coefficients on the 
year dummies.  
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price paths for each state, we begin with a stylized dataset 
for our projection—which represents a hypothetical state 
(or composite of several states).20 For this process, hous-
ing price growth is treated as an endogenous variable and 
generated iteratively. That is, because lags of the depen-
dent variable are included as explanatory variables, out-of-
sample predicted values must be generated iteratively, one 
quarter at a time. After each iteration, the newly imputed 
value for housing price growth then becomes the one quar-
ter lag for housing price growth used in the next iteration.  
The process begins with a benign set of assumptions re-
garding starting lagged values and inputted values for em-
ployment and interest rates for the 12 quarters; thus, we re-
fer to the predicted values as a “projected” price path as 
opposed to a “forecast” of what will actually occur given 
current conditions. Less benign assumptions regarding 
the inputted data are also explored in the sensitivity anal-
ysis, however, an important part of our analysis is to test 
whether, even from a benign starting point, the estimated 
relationships presented earlier are capable of producing 
substantial drops in housing prices with probabilities, that 
while very low, are large enough to have important eco-
nomic consequences.21 For the different estimated equa-
tions, the model is then used to generate 1000 separate 12 
quarter paths for housing prices. The Monte Carlo method 
is similar to generating out-of-sample predicted values 
with a couple of twists: 
1. For each year of the three-year projection, the year fixed-
effect is chosen at random (based on the actual share 
of observations for which each dummy is included in 
the relevant regression). Which year fixed effects are 
used is tremendously important. Assumptions regard-
ing the year fixed effects could be circumvented by ex-
cluding year dummies from the regressions. However, 
as shown earlier in this section, the year fixed effects 
are extremely important and appear to control for sub-
stantial unobserved heterogeneity. Excluding the year 
fixed effects would almost surely bias the estimated 
coefficients. 
2. For each quarter of the projection, a stochastic term is 
added to the prediction. The stochastic term is normally 
distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation equal 
to the RMSE (i.e., the standard deviation of the error 
term from the regression). 
From the 1000 paths generated from each specifica-
tion, 1000 cumulative three-year housing price changes can 
be calculated. These cumulative price changes represent 
the distribution of projected outcomes. Year fixed effects 
capture unobserved factors unique to a particular year—
such as general economic conditions etc. Randomly choos-
ing which fixed effect to include in the projection assumes 
that these unobserved factors are likely to occur again with 
similar probabilities as observed in the data. With this ap-
proach, unobserved factors can be used to better formu-
late the distribution of possible outcomes without the un-
derstanding the complexity underlying these factors—or to 
what degree specific unobserved factors are playing. Note 
that while this approach is used to gain insight into the se-
verity of low probability events, it is not done by simply em-
ploying a (log-) linear model and extrapolating it out to ex-
tremes (that may not be present in the estimating data). For 
example, low probability events are not simulated by input-
ting extreme values for lagged employment or housing price 
growth, or by inputting extreme interest rate scenarios into 
a linear model. This approach would assume that estimated 
linear relationships hold over a much longer range than 
what is reasonable. On the contrary, here extreme outcomes 
are generated from uncertainty that is observed in the data 
and measured by the RMSE and the influence of unobserved 
factors captured in the year fixed effects. 
To reiterate and expound on some issues raised earlier, 
this approach is built on a highly simplified model of the 
housing market, however, despite its simplicity, we believe 
that the approach is insightful and the costs associated with 
a richer model likely exceed the benefits. First, given the 
number and immense complexities of events occurring in 
recent years, identifying structural parameters, at this point 
in time, is likely to produce results that are either mislead-
ing or ones that contain so much uncertainty so as to have 
little practical value. While maintaining a reduced form ap-
proach, the model could still be made more complex. For 
example, additional explanatory variables could be added 
or a vector autoregression (VAR) framework could be ad-
opted that would treat employment (and potentially other 
variables) as endogenous. The downside of adding ad-
ditional variables is that this requires additional assump-
tions for the out-of-sample observations needed to gener-
ate the projected housing price paths. This adds another 
layer of uncertainty to the process and makes assessing the 
importance of a few core fundamental variables less trans-
parent. Additionally, many of the available variables that 
could potentially be added to the model are highly corre-
lated with either housing price growth or employment 
growth, which limits their value added. The downside of 
a VAR approach is that it also hampers transparency. On 
the plus side, a VAR recognizes that variables such as em-
ployment and housing price growth do not move inde-
pendently, however, expecting to correctly identifying this 
relationship over the past decade (with any degree of pre-
cision) is likely quixotic. 
With our approach the implications from alternative em-
ployment or interest rate scenarios can easily be explored. 
(For example, see the sensitivity analysis later in this sec-
tion.) While this does not allow for a dynamic relationship 
between the housing and employment markets, for exam-
ple, analyzing the impact of a shock to one of these sectors 
is again quite transparent. To the extent that one believes 
that these markets play off each other, via feedback loops, 
projected paths can be viewed as lower (or upper) bounds.  
20. The stylized dataset uses average values, by quarter, for each of the economic variables. These values are used as the initial lags and are re-
peated for each year of the projection (the exception being housing price growth). 
21. Later, out-of-sample state forecasts that start with observed state-level data are also explored.  
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4.2.2. Results from the Monte Carlo simulation 
Results from the simulation are summarized in Table 
4. The first row of Table 4 reports the RMSE for each of 
the regressions. The remainder of the table shows the cu-
mulative percent change in projected real house prices at 
the end of the 12 quarter projection for each of the differ-
ent regressions and at different points in the distribution. 
The top set of projections are for “group 1” states in the 
sense that the group 1 (i.e., high price variance) dummy 
is set to 1. The lower set of projections are for states in 
group 3 (i.e., states with lowest housing price variances) 
in the sense that all state group dummies are set to 0 (and 
thus, the constant term pertains to group 3, the dummy 
that was dropped in the regression). For columns 2, 5 and 
8, projections labeled as group 3 are the same as those for 
group 1, since the corresponding regressions include only 
data on group 1 states. For columns 3, 6 and 9, projec-
tions for group 1 are the same as those for group 3, since 
here, the corresponding regressions include only data on 
groups 1 and 2.22 
Based on the regression results when including all 
of the data, a severe stress event, associated with a one-
percent probability, yields a cumulative price decline of 
between 19% and 23% after 12 quarters. The price de-
cline associated with a one-percent stress scenario is also 
within this same range when relying on the regressions 
that include all quarters, but subsets of states (columns 2 
and 3). Corresponding estimates for the severity of a five-
percent stress scenario are between 5.2 and 6.6 percentage 
points lower. Turning to the results based on regressions 
for the other subsamples yields very different results—
suggesting that the structural breaks found in the regres-
sion analysis have important implications for low prob-
ability events. Using the pre-1991 regression results, 
one-percent scenarios are associated with price declines 
of between 22% and 29%. The results based on the group 
1 regression yield an over 27% price decline. For the post-
1990 regressions, simulation results are even more dire, 
with one-percent scenarios associated with price declines 
of between 33% and 40%. The 40% decline results from 
the post-1990 regression and including all states. It is this 
scenario that stands out. When including all data or only 
pre-1991 data, the projected severity of one-percent sce-
narios are 25–50% smaller. 
The past few years aside, the one-percent scenar-
ios presented in Table 4 are much more severe than any 
threeyear experience for the nation or for any of the three 
groups of states examined here. For example, the sharp-
est real (employment-weighted) 12-quarter price decline 
ranges from 10.6 (for group 1 states) to 15.6% (for group 
2 states). (Refer to Figure 2.) However, many states have 
experienced 12 quarter price declines similar to the one-
percent simulation results. For example, 26 states have 
experienced 12-quarter real price declines of more than 
20%, while 7 states have experienced real price declines 
22. Also, note that for the post-1990 regression that includes all states, 
the estimated coefficients on the state group dummies equal 0 (at 
least when rounding to three decimal points); thus, projections 
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exceeding 30%.23 While the magnitude of the decline in 
house prices in recent years (at the state level) is unusual, 
what is more unusual appears to be the correlation in 
housing price changes across states. For example, the 12 
quarter price decline for group 1 states is more than dou-
ble anything this group experienced prior to the Great Re-
cession. Prior to 2006, large price drops in one state (or re-
gion) were partially offset by stronger housing markets in 
other parts of the country—this time that was not true.    
While the severity of a one-percent scenario has increased 
substantially in the latter period, the projected housing price 
distribution does not widen. In fact, density plots in Fig-
ure 3 show that the reverse is true—i.e., the price distribu-
tion is much tighter post-1990. This is driven to a large de-
gree by the much smaller RMSE for the post-1990 period. As 
noted earlier, the RMSE increases by roughly a factor of four 
when moving from post-1991 to pre-1990. (Recall that the 
standard deviation of the stochastic term used in the simu-
lation equals the regression RMSE.) The difference between 
the median and onepercent scenario was between 34 and 37 
percentage points when using pre-1991 regressions. Post-
1990, this difference falls to between 8 and 11 percentage 
points. Thus, despite a tighter price distribution, the severity 
of a one percent scenario increases substantially post-1991. 
In fact, the median price change from the post-1990 projec-
tions is a price decline of between 22% and 32%! Pre-1991, the 
median of the projected price changes ranges from increases 
of 5–15%. The tightening of the post-1990 price distribu-
tion is also observed when comparing the oneand five-per-
cent scenarios. Pre-1991, one-percent scenarios are projected 
to be 8–12 percentage points worse than five-percent scenar-
ios. Post-1990, this difference drops to between two and four 
percentage points. 
The evidence suggests a structural break and the simula-
tions based on post-1990 data look very different from those 
for the earlier period. This suggests that a new housing price 
stress test may be in order. However, the simulation results 
based on post-1990 data are peculiar—and do not seem sen-
sible. For example, it does not seem reasonable expect hous-
ing prices to fall substantially (i.e., the median scenario) and 
for the uncertainty about future price changes to be much 
smaller than in the past.24 One alternative would be to con-
struct a stress scenario using all of the years of data. But, at 
the cost of simplicity, adjust the path based on several fac-
tors, such as the location of the housing, creditworthiness of 
borrowers and short-term trends designed to capture mo-
mentum within the market. What is clear from the simula-
tions is that OFHEO’s ALMO stress test appears quite weak 
compared to any of our alternatives. 
4.3. Additional sensitivity checks 
Table 5 presents a number of alternative 12-quarter 
price declines for one- and five-percent scenarios. These al-
ternatives test the robustness of our core results. Recall that 
the simulation results presented in Table 4 were generated 
assuming a benign employment and interest rate regime. 
In some instances these checks support substantially more 
severe stress scenario. 
One of the sensitivity checks replaces the benign em-
ployment scenario with a severe one. The severe employ-
ment scenario is based on the worst 16 quarter experience 
of any state present in the HPI data. In this case, the em-
ployment path is that experienced by Michigan between 
Figure 3. Simulated housing price distributions. (A) Based on data 
from 1975 to 2009. (B) Based on data from 1975 to 1990. (C) Based 
on data from 1991 to 2009. Source: Authors’ calculations simulated 
housing price distributions in this figure. For each legend entry, the 
group(s) listed before the colon refers to the states included in the re-
gression used for the simulation. After the colon, the group of states 
that the projections apply to is listed. Three-year cumulative house 
price changes are normalized so that 1.00 implies zero real growth in 
house prices.  
23. These numbers are based on the HPI (beginning in 1975) and exclude post-2001 data. Extending the data through quarter 3 of 2009 increases 
the number of states that have experienced declines of 20% or more to 32; and, the number that have experienced declines of 30% or more to 11. 
24. Given that these simulated distributions are generated using a benign economic starting scenario, the model certainly does not seem to per-
form well here. It may be that the regression specification, while reduced form and not restrictive in many of its assumptions, is not flexible 
enough to accurately models this later period. Alternative regression specifications could allow for nonlinear relationships or allow estimated 
coefficients to vary depending on whether house prices are rising or falling.   
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1978 and 1982, when employment fell by a total of 14%. Re-
placing the benign employment scenario with this severe 
one yields much greater price declines. For specifications 
using all years of data or pre-1991 data, this results in one-
percent house price drops that are almost 40 to over 70% 
larger than the analogous results (presented in Table 4). 
Thus, instead of the 19–23% decline in house prices under 
the benign employment scenario (and including all years of 
data), one-percent price declines are now nearly one-third, 
or greater. Again, see Table 5.   
A second sensitivity check raises the ten-year Treasury 
rate by one standard deviation (2.77 percentage points) for 
the entire 12 quarter projection, but leaves the yield spread 
unchanged. This is intended to examine the implication of 
a jump in mortgage interest rates on severe stress scenar-
ios. For the specifications including all years of data, this 
interest rate shock results in one-percent price declines 
that are 25–73% larger—i.e., price declines of between 27% 
and 38%. 
A third check performs the same Monte Carlo exercise 
used for Table 4, but replaces the estimated regression co-
efficients with ones that are employment-weighted. See 
Table 3, which compares lagged coefficients from the em-
ployment-weighted specification to those from the un-
weighted approach. Employment-weighting adjusts for 
the fact that states differ tremendously in size. Without em-
ployment-weighting, the experience of Wyoming, for ex-
ample, is given equal weight as that of California or Texas. 
For the post-1990 period, income-weighting has little affect 
on the simulation results. For the other timeperiods, how-
ever, house price declines during one-percent scenarios are 
roughly 30% smaller than without employment weighting. 
Thus, while the adverse employment scenario suggest a 
more severe stress scenario than those in Table 4, employ-
ment weighting lends support for a less severe scenario. 
Finally, the simulation is performed assuming a con-
stant RMSE. Recall that for each quarterly projection a ran-
dom component is added with mean 0 and a standard de-
viation equal to that from the respective regression. As 
noted earlier, the RMSE is much smaller for the post-1990 
period. Here, the RMSE from the specification that in-
cludes all of the data is always used for the standard devi-
ation on the stochastic term. For the full period, this has lit-
tle impact, since these specification all have RMSEs that are 
(equal to or) very close to the new constant value. For the 
two sub-periods, the results are mixed. In some instances, 
one-percent scenarios are similar to the analogous cases 
from Table 4. In one instance (projections for group 1 states 
based on post-1990 data), the estimate is 74% larger. In this 
instance, the RMSE used is 2.5 times the size of the one as-
sociated with the estimated coefficients used in the simu-
lation. As noted earlier, many of the post-1990 projections 
are peculiar. In this instance, even the 99th percentile sug-
gests a substantial price decline. At the other extreme, the 
specification that includes all states and pre-1991 data finds 
the price decline at the first percentile that is much more 
modest—ranging from 14% to 21%. In this case, the con-
stant RMSE assumption reduces the standard deviation of 
the stochastic term by more than 40%. 
5. Conclusions: Putting it all together 
We investigate whether statistical models estimated at 
different time periods and for different groups of states 
would lead to a clear conclusion about whether a new 
housing price stress test—replacing OFHEO’s ALMO sce-
nario—seems appropriate. Regression analysis finds that 
estimated parameters are quite sensitive to the period and 
groups of states used to estimate the model. There seem 
to be two offsetting effects at work. The models based 
upon earlier data show greater sensitivity to employment 
growth and the level of interest rates and, also, suggest a 
higher constant rate of growth in real house prices than 
models estimated using data from later years. These all 
tend to lead to lower stress tests and lower credit costs, 
all else equal. Offsetting these patterns is the fact that the 
RMSE for the earlier models is larger than that estimated 
in later years. Also, the parameters from the model esti-
mated using more recent data suggest substantial mo-
mentum from recent house price trends, which is con-
sistent with bubble phenomena and greater potential for 
extreme price volatility. More momentum implies less 
mean reversion. This is true throughout the post-1990 pe-
riod, but is more pronounced for group 1 (high price vol-
atility) states. 
Thus, whatever conclusions we draw rest upon some 
judgments about the particular scenarios and assumptions 
used in the simulation analysis that generates stress scenar-
ios (and which could then be used to estimate credit costs). 
The models estimated since the 1990s generate more stress-
ful scenarios than ones based upon earlier data. That is, the 
5th or 1st percentile outcomes are much worse than previ-
ous models would have suggested. In terms of the Katrina 
example, the more recent estimates suggest that the 100 
year flood is worse than previously thought. However, the 
simulated housing price distributions using only post-1990 
data are peculiar: the distribution has a much smaller vari-
ance than for the other time-periods and the distributions 
suggest almost no prospect for real price growth. For ex-
ample, these results sometimes suggest that even 99th per-
centile scenario (i.e., an extremely strong housing market) 
sometimes shows price declines. While insights (with re-
spect to momentum etc.) can be gleaned from the post-1990 
analysis, simulations based on this period alone likely do 
not represent sensible scenarios. 
However, when using all years of data (or even only 
pre-1991 data), it still appears that a new housing price 
stress test is desired. Even with benign assumptions with 
respect to employment growth and interest rates, simula-
tions suggest that the ALMO test is too weak. Incorporat-
ing more severe employment or interest rate environments 
makes the case for a new, more severe, stress test even 
stronger. On balance, the sensitivity checks point toward a 
more severe stress scenario than what use for our core sce-
nario. Although, the employment-weighted regression re-
sults weaken this conclusion. 
From the numerous results generated via a relatively 
simple and single equation model of house prices, several 
additional conclusions can be drawn: 
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1. During normal economic circumstances, the results 
based upon the full sample seem plausible. That is, a 3 
year decline in real prices of about 20% (Table 4 column 
1) seems appropriate for a 1% degree of security and 
about 15% for a 5% degree of security. 
2. As concerns about a recession rise, which was surely the 
case at the end of 2006, our sensitivity analysis suggests 
a stress test scenario with decline of more than 40% (see 
Table 5 and the 2 standard deviation shock to employ-
ment). This is quite similar to the recent FRB stress test 
when one accounts for 2006 and 2007 growth rates lead-
ing up to the numbers they project for the following 
two years, 2009 and 2010. 
3. Our results are based upon real price changes. Nominal 
shocks would be larger during inflationary times and 
should be adjusted accordingly. See Figure 1, which 
shows that the ALMO scenario was a weaker test in 
the years leading up to the Great Recession (than it was 
during the 1980s) because it was defined in nominal 
terms. According to the recent FRB minutes, the stress 
scenario ought to be increased by 3%, which is the mid-
point of their forecasts of inflation over the next three 
years.25 
4. The correlation between house prices across states in-
creased in recent years. This contributed to the finan-
cial crisis, but whether this pattern will continue is not 
known. The distribution of house prices for Group 1 
states is wider with a higher expected value than that 
for Group 2 and 3 states. This was not the case pre-1991 
when the distribution of prices for Group 1 states was 
much more skewed to the left. Part of this ambiguity 
probably stems from the use of state data. Our guess is 
that variations among markets will be more clear-cut if 
MSA data are used. Absent stronger evidence, we sug-
gest that the regulators give much more attention to 
this issue going forward and prepare stronger stress 
tests for different parts of the country as circumstances 
suggest. 
The results also suggest two other changes to the ALMO 
process. First, a stress test ought to be continually updated 
to incorporate new information. The resulting stress test 
will vary as new data and market conditions arise, as the 
parameterization of the house price process change, and 
as sensitivities to changes other economic variables evolve. 
Second, a stress test should be stated in real and not nom-
inal terms. If ALMO had been applied in real terms, per-
haps additional capital would have been held and the con-
sequences of the Great Recession (of 2007–2009) would 
have been less onerous. Stress testing is an ongoing pro-
cess that adjusts to changing market conditions including 
inflation. Legislating a stress test scenario stated in nomi-
nal terms that holds for an extended period seems to lack 
justification. 
Evidence supporting substantial variations in the stress 
test scenario across groups of states is ambiguous. In fact, 
there is some evidence of increased correlation among 
states. This is issue is ripe for additional research to ascer-
tain whether this increased correlation is an aberration or 
something expected to continue. If it continue, then the 
added value from geographical variations to the stress test 
may be small; however, such increased correlation would 
surely imply a reduction in the benefits from geographi-
cally diversifying portfolios, and would substantially lower 
the benefits from geographic diversification cited by Calem 
and Follain (2003). 
One topic of ongoing debate is whether regulatory cap-
ital levels and, in essence, the stress test ought to vary over 
the business cycle (BIS, 2010). For example, more stressful 
scenarios may be appropriate during the boom part of a cy-
cle in order to provide above average amounts of capital. 
Similarly, a less stringent stress test might be more appro-
priate during a recessionary period in order not to dimin-
ish the time to recovery. The Basel III plan is an example of 
a countercylical capital policy. Our results do not address 
this issue since the basic set of initial economic conditions 
for our simulations are the same. An extension of our work 
could be developed that would generate simulations for 
different sets of starting conditions. 
More generally, we readily acknowledge that these 
judgments are based upon our reading of these results and 
many others that we have considered. The simulation ex-
ercise is complex (even with a relatively simple underly-
ing econometric model) and there is little doubt that some 
analysts might reach different judgments; however, it is 
surely the case that the process and resulting picture could 
be made much more complex. For example, consider the 
thorny issue of regional diversification, not addressed here. 
Further consider potential variations in the stress test sce-
narios based upon initial conditions prior to the stress; or 
variations in interest rate conditions—which until the re-
cent crisis was considered by many experts the most seri-
ous threat to the mortgage market. All of these would in-
crease complexity, further cloud transparency and heighten 
the need for subjective judgments by those responsible for 
defining a stress test scenario. On the other hand, this pa-
per underscores the contention that stress test scenarios are 
inherently complex and should not be written in stone by 
legislation. Rather, a team of independent analysts ought 
to be constantly in search of whether a change in the sta-
tus quo is needed. They should be expected to make their 
best case, but the ultimate decision-makers should harbor 
no illusions that the evidence underlying the final recom-
mendations of an extreme event will be crystal clear. We 
are confident of this much.  
25. See Table 1 in http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20100127.pdf .  
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